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Abstract. 
The basic point of the paper is that, under certain circumstances, groups which take 
extremist positions on issues tend also to use extremist methods such as terrorism and 
violence to pursue those goals.  I assume that the leaders of extremist groups are rational, 
therefore, given their goals, they choose the best methods to achieve them.  From this point 
of view,  the basic difference between extremist methods of political competition and 
moderate methods is just that extremist methods are risky, implying the possibility of 
bigger success or bigger failure compared to moderate methods.   
Extremists in position adopt extremist methods when there is an indivisibility which 
characterizes the relationship between the intermediate goal of the group and its ultimate 
goal.  In the paper I look at three examples:  Communism (control over the means of 
production is an intermediate goal to the achievement of a communist society), Nationalism 
(control over territory is an intermediate goal to the achievement of nationhood) and 
Islamic Fundamentalism (ridding the Muslim nations of foreign and secular influences is an 
intermediate goal to the achievement of an Islamic society).  In turn, conflict between each 
of these and opposing groups (respectively, capitalism, other nations with the same 
                                                 
• A previous version of this paper was given at the University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy, on 
April 2, 2004.  I am indebted to Carla Marchese and Mario Ferrero for helpful comments.  Any remaining 
errors are my own.  I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for 
financial support, and to the International Centre For Economic Research (ICER), Turin, Italy  for providing a 
most pleasant and stimulating environment and support during which time this paper was written.  
territorial ambition, secularism), in a sense, inevitable as it results from the conflict 
between their ultimate goals. 
If correct, the paper would appear to raise a troubling challenge to liberal theory.  
Freedom of thought is central to liberal theory provided that democratic methods are used 
to pursue that goal. If there tends to be a correlation between extremist positions and 
extremist methods, then it may be difficult for the state to combat the latter without 
imposing controls on the former.  
The most important policy implication of the paper is that one should look at the 
goals of extremist group in order to understand their actions.  One reason is that it is the 
purported indivisibility of the goal which explains the extremism of the actions, and if one 
can un- bundle the goal or make the indivisible divisible, then there may be ways to 
provide these goals in a way which satisfies some of the members of the group and thus 
dries up support for the grander ambitions of the leaders of extremist groups. 
 
   1
1.  Introduction  
 
   The classic way of thinking about extremist groups is that they are marginal, 
alienated, poor, etc.    The previous literature on political extremism is reviewed by Knoke 
(1990).  He points out that explanations of political extremism in the past were often 
dominated by psychological explanations.  Thus, for example, individuals were held to 
experience intolerable psychological stresses in their daily lives, and their joining in mob 
actions was interpreted as a safety valve that let off steam, but accomplished little in the 
way of solving their problems.  In the same vein, participants in extremist movements were 
often held to be those who were marginal to society, or who were dispossessed by 
economic change.  However, empirical evidence has now accumulated which contradicts 
these explanations, at least as applied to social movements in general.   The evidence drawn 
from such classic social movements as the Southern Black civil rights movement, the 
women's movement and Three Mile Island protests, poor peoples movements, and social 
protest under Weimar consistently suggests that, rather than marginal and anomic persons, 
collective actions generally attracted participants of higher social economic status who 
were more integrated and better connected to societal institutions than were the non-
participants. 
Instead, the modern approach tends to see social movements, including extremist 
movements, as the main vehicle for excluded people to gain access to and influence within 
an established political system.   It follows that extremism can be modelled as a form of 
political competition.  Thus the general point of view here is that extremism is a rational 
choice in the sense that the individuals involved choose appropriate methods to reach their 
goals.  In this chapter we are referring to what might be called “strategic rationality or 
rationality of the leadership”.  The next chapter looks at the behavior of the individuals 
within the group.   
Other scholars have adopted the rational choice perspective.  Pape (2003) develops 
a strategic logic of suicide terrorism in particular and shows that. Viewed from the 
perspective of the terrorist organization, suicide attacks are designed to achieve specific 
political purposes: to coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilize additional 
recruits and financial support, or both (2002, p.  4).  With reference to the universe of 
suicide attacks of 1980- 2001, he shows that most suicide attacks occurred in organized,   2
coherent campaigns, that they were aimed at democracies (which are more vulnerable to 
this kind of pressure), and that they were specifically directed at nationalist goals.  All of 
these are consistent with strategic rationality, but not with fanaticism or irrationality. 
  Here are some examples of extremist movements.   
                1.  Classic  interwar  extremism  in  Europe:  Italian  Fascists,  Nazis, 
Communists. 
      2. Colonial extremism, e.g., the anti- colonial movements in India, South 
Africa and Algeria.  In his famous book, The Wretched of the Earth (1963), Franz Fanon 
wrote that violence was the only way to get rid of it colonialism and domination.  He 
developed a psychology of extremism, centered on the pleasure and rejuvenation to be 
experienced in the struggle for a just cause.  On the other hand, Ghandi espoused a 
philosophy of nonviolence as the most effective way to rid India of the British, and Nelson 
Mandela dislodged the apartheid regime largely without bloodshed.  Recently, Mark 
Juergensmeyer has suggested in his book Ganhdi’s Way (1992) that Gandhi’s methods 
have a place in resolving many important conflicts in the world  today, and there is no 
doubt in my opinion that he is correct in this. 
           3.  1960's ÷ 90's Europe:  During this period, Europe experienced substantial 
extremism on both the left and the right.  Movements included those involving the Red 
Brigades and Propaganda 2 in Italy (which culminated in the kidnapping and subsequent 
murder of Italy’s most famous politician, Aldo Moro) the  Baader Meinhof Gang in 
Germany, and the rise of the anti immigration National Front of Le Pen in France.  
Kitschelt (1997) has analyzed the rise of the right in the 1990’s as a response to the rise of 
the left previously.                      
4.  McCarthyism in the US in the 1950’s and more recently the advent of the 
right wing “militias” there. 
5.   The genocide in Rwanda.  
6.   Contemporary  Islamic and Palestinian suicide terror. 
 
  In some of these cases the rationality of the means used, ex post, appears obvious, 
even though it may have been murky at the time.  For example, in the case of Italy, the Red 
Brigades essentially achieved some of their objectives (the Communist Party was never 
brought into the government) even though the movement died.  In Algeria, India and South   3
Africa all of the anti colonial movements succeeded.  In France, the government adopted 
some of the restrictions on immigration favored by the extreme right.   In Israel- Palestine, 
it is not obvious that the objectives of Hamas have been achieved, although Pape (2003) 
produces a long discussion of this question.  Other cases are even more problematic:  for 
example, in the case of  the Nazis or the genocide in Rwanda it is not obvious what, if 
anything, was achieved, although it should be remembered that one has to judge the 
rationality of extremism by their success in achieving their own goals, even when these are 
repugnant to most of humanity.   
  The outline of the paper is as follows:  the next section introduces a distinction 
which is sometimes made between two kinds of extremism, extremism in position vs 
extremism of method, and introduces the basic point of the paper, which is that sometimes 
the use of the latter follows from the former and is not independent of it.  Section 3 asks 
why some groups sometimes adopt extremist positions and briefly mentions some answers 
to this question which have been mentioned in the literature.  Section 4 asks how such 
groups can obtain power using democratic methods.  Section 5 then turns our basic model 
of the calculus of disconsent and asks why such groups tend to use extremist methods. We 
develop a simple model of this, and discuss some comparative static implications.  Section 
6 then turns to methods of combating extremism.  Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.   Two kinds of extremism? 
 
A number of different definitions of extremism can be given.  The most common 
distinction that is made is that between two kinds of extremism: 
 
1.  An extremist person or group can be defined as one whose equilibrium position is 
located at a "corner" rather than in the interior on some dimension (for example, the 
left -- right dimension in political space). 
2..  Alternatively, a political extremist could be defined as one who uses extremist 
methods, for example, bombings, inflammatory language, terrorist activity, and so 
forth, but whose platform is or may be centrist rather than extremist in political (left 
-- right) space.   4
 
  Some, for example Galeotti (2002), expand on this distinction to develop a typology 
of extremism.   Assuming all types are possible this gives the four combinations shown in 
Figure 1.  The horizontal axis shows extremism in method, the vertical one extremism in 
position.  The Green party, for example, adopts what to some is an extremist position with 
respect to the environment, but never uses terrorism or other violent methods of protest 
(although some Greens use civil disobedience).  On the other hand, Italian fascism of the 
1920’s has been famously described as an “extremism of the middle”—that is, it was 
extremist in the use of violent methods of political competition, but its policies were 
centrist.  Modern Italian parties like the Ulivo and Forza Italia are centrist (centre – left and 
centre – right) in both method and policies.  And groups like Al Qaeda, Hamas and the Red 
Brigades are extremist in both their proposed policies and their methods. 
  A somewhat similar distinction is made by Pierre Salmon (2002) who contrasts the 
group’s proposed policies or positions and the salience with which this position is held. 
Some groups care deeply about a certain policy:  their extremism lies in this dimension 
alone.  Hence Salmon calls them “monomaniacs” (no pejorative connotation intended). 
Noting that what makes extremism irrational is that large changes in government policies 
tend to have unpredictable consequences, he explains the rationality of their extremism this 
way: “The singleness of dimension allows one to overcome the sobering effects of 
uncertainty:  only the consequences of action along the dimension concerned are relevant 
and their prediction may be straightforward.  This, then, makes extremism rational.” 
(Salmon (2002) p. 72).  The relationship between this line of reasoning and that of Galeotti 
appears straightforward:  groups are more likely to exhibit a violent propensity when they 
care deeply about a single issue.   
  However there is something missing in these accounts which is central to many 
kinds of extremism, especially its historically most important kinds.  This is the fact that in 
many cases the goals of extremist groups are indivisible.  The most obvious examples are 
groups which feel dispossessed from their “homeland” and take extremist actions for this 
cause.  Of course a homeland can be larger or smaller but still there is this element:  a 
group either has one, or it doesn’t.  Is it sufficiently large that the government can provide 
the basic functions of the modern state?  Does it have sufficient control over citizenship, 
taxation, property rights, security and the means of coercion and violence to function   5
effectively? Similarly, for years many groups fought for the goal of a communist society, 
and a central tenet of that movement is that the achievement of communism necessitated a 
revolution and the overthrow of the bourgeois order.  The reason is that it is difficult to 
have an economy which is half communist / half capitalist in the classic sense of a 
communist society in which there would be a new man and so forth.  A third example is the 
control over the means of violence.  In successful states this is a monopoly of the state.  It 
can be eroded through gangs, terrorism, etc., but in the end the state is either basically “in 
control of the means of violence or it is not, and when the state loses control over it has 
essentially failed.   Yet another example is Osama bin Laden’s goal of a restoration of 
Islamic rule in Arabic countries (see Lewis (2003), Zakaria (2003).  Either a country is 
secular, based on Roman law or the Napoleonic code or some other secular source or it is 
religious, based on a religious doctrine such as Catholicism or Sharia law.   Finally the 
same point applies to the aspirations for independence of a group which is under 
occupation.  Either the British leave India or Israel, or the French leave Algeria, or they do 
not, either the blacks have a vote in South Africa (in which case they will control the 
government, being an overwhelming majority) or they do not.  All of these goals are 
indivisible.  In these cases, my fundamental argument is that there is a natural 
complementarity between the goal of the extremist group, which is indivisible, and the 
methods, which are extremist
1.  That is, there is a natural complementarity between 
extremist goals and extremist methods.  Thus it is difficult to separate the two, as we have 
in  Figure 1 above.  
Other extremist groups have goals which are clearly divisible:  examples are the 
Greens’ goal of a cleaner environment, the National Rifle Association’s goal of fewer 
restrictions on gun ownership, and so forth.  Implicitly, I will argue, these groups never 
reach the heights of fanaticism characteristic of groups which have indivisible goals. 
 
                                                 
1 A different distinction is that between ordinary extremism and what might be called “totalitarian” 
extremism.  Members of totalitarian extremist groups, as exemplified by classical Nazism and 
communism, and possibly some variants of Islamic fundamentalism, tend to be extreme in their 
worldview and this viewpoint dictates extremist positions on a whole host of issues, not a single 
dimension.   The classic analysis of American extremism by Lipset and Rabb (1970, 1978) implicitly 
refers to this type of extremism when they define the essence of extremism as “monism” or “anti- 
pluralism”.  Thus their book is titled “The Politics of Unreason” and they describe such people as unable 
to compromise.  Implicitly the variable here is the comprehensiveness of the extremist outlook the number 
of dimensions covered by the extremist world view.    6
3.    Why do they choose extremist positions? 
 
  I do not have anything new to say about why some groups choose extremist 
positions beyond what has been said by others or what I said in my book The Political 
Economy of Dictatorship (1998).  One suggestion made there especially with respect to the 
rise of the Nazi party was that extremist positions are often a response to the failure of the 
parties of the centre to act on or satisfy the demands of the people (with respect to 
unemployment and law and order in 1930’s Germany).  Similarly it has been argued that 
the rise of fundamentalist Islam has been a response to the failure of Arab governments 
(e.g., the failed socialism of Nasser (see Giurirato and Molinari (2002), Zakaria (2003);  the 
fact that all Arab governments are dictatorships, and not of the developmental kind).  
Similarly in the USA the Vietnam war gave birth to the Weatherman, etc.   
  Extremism can also arise as a response to the difficulty of forming a coalition with 
moderates (Salmon (2002).  Or it may be a response to the “opening up of space” on the 
extremes as formerly right wing or left wing parties move towards the centre.  One example 
is the rise of the radical right in Israel (which was born as the result of the Camp David 
accords (Sprinzak (1989).  In the same way, Kitschelt  (1997) explains the rise of both the 
extreme left and the extreme right parties in as due to the fact that the conventional leftist 
and rightist parties had moved towards the centre.  He also notes the increased salience of 
the libertarian - authoritarian dimension which he traces to changing production systems 
and the consequent new appeal of free market policies as the result of the twin factors of 
globalization and the failure of communist systems.  These were combined with 
authoritarianism to generate the policies of the extreme right in Europe
2.  
  Finally the rise of “extremism” as a response to the fact that one’s homeland is 
occupied by a “foreign” power, or as a response to dictatorship (under either of which 
normal methods of political competition are proscribed) is easy to explain. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
2 But note that in Kitschelt’s (1997) analysis, the opening up of space is not sufficient:  one still needs the 
supply of entrepreneurship to account for what happened. 
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4.   How do they get power?  (1) Democratic or moderate avenues. 
 
    The general result of political competition under various assumptions (either 
Downsian, or multi party with probabilistic voting) is the median voter theorem.  The basic 
idea is that, by moving to the centre, each party can gain more votes from centrist voters, 
and, as long as there are only two parties, not lose any at the extremes.  This median 
solution is also welfare maximizing (Brennan (2002), p.  93, Mueller).     
     One can then list all of the conditions under which non- convergence would occur: 
many parties, ideological preferences (especially the preferences of party activists), extra 
dimensions, etc.  But these outcomes are inherently unstable and do not represent an 
extremist equilibrium (Brennan (2002)).   Public choice also looks for socially rational 
outcomes (Brennan (2002)) and extremism is usually held to represent an irrational 
outcome. 
  How then can extremists get power through democratic processes? 
1.   One way suggested by Pierre Salmon (2002) that extremists can take power is via a  
coalition of monomaniac extremists. Thus two or more groups, each of which is 
“monomanical” in a separate dimension, can form a coalition large enough to win power.  
A  necessary condition for this  is the existence of at least  two dimensions.  The second 
dimension might be race or ethnicity, or national security, or nationalism.  
2.  Another possibility is via a coalition with centrists  (the National Rifle Association in 
the US, orthodox Jews in Israel are to some at least extremist groups, but which obtain 
power to have their preferred policies because they are “monomaniacal” in Salmon’s terms) 
3.  Majority extremism--Another way which does not require two dimensions is described 
in a recent book by Chua (2004).  In her analysis the majority sometimes unites in hatred of 
a Amarket dominant minority (here the extremism is one of method, not position).  This is 
particularly likely when the minority in question constitutes a separate ethnic group.  This 
is a version of the “totalitarian democracy” so often feared.  Zakaria (2003) has also 
discussed what he calls the rise of “illiberal” democracy -  democracy with more or less 
competitive elections but without constitutional protections for human rights and other 
checks and balances- in many places in the contemporary world.  The absence of these 
checks and protections is what makes majority extremism possible.    8
5.  How do they get power (2) why do they choose extremist methods? 
 
(i)  Extremist methods are risky 
 
  In general, extremist methods are simply a form of political competition or rent 
seeking.  Groups may resort to extremist methods because they are frozen out of long term 
contracts, ie., there is an explicit or implicit refusal of accommodation of their demands by 
the government and other parties of the centre (cf Giuriato and Molinari (2002)). Or there 
are barriers of some kind to their entry into the political marketplace.  Or they are reacting 
to extremism at the opposite end of the spectrum
3.  Or they may just believe that they can 
get more of what they want with threats and violence.   
  Assuming the groups are rational, perhaps the central point about extremist methods 
compared to normal democratic methods of political competition or rent seeking is that 
they are risky.  Because they are illegal, or can get out of hand easily, they can provoke a 
reaction either from the state or from the opposition, and they are therefore are more likely 
to involve greater losses than conventional politics.  Consequently the choice between 
extremist methods and moderation can be analyzed in the same way as the choice between 
a criminal career and a legitimate one, as in models of the decision to commit crimes 
pioneered by Becker (1968).  This point is explored in the model that follows. The point is 
to show that under certain circumstances the use of extremist means (e.g., terrorism, 
violence) follows from the extremist goals of the group.  Thus it is no accident that the 
most serious forms of extremism also use terrorist methods.  The main conclusion is that 
one has to understand the goals of the groups in order to understand their actions and to 
formulate policy towards them. 
 
                                                 
3  Indeed I suggest the following hypothesis; in every case where there is an extremist movement, they are 
reacting to what they perceive to be an extremist threat on the opposite side.  This hypothesis seems to fit 
all of the examples: Fascism and Nazism was in part a reaction to communism, the Red Brigades a 
reaction to extremism on the right,  the Jewish settlers a reaction to Hamas (or vice versa),  Le Pen in 
France a reaction to the libertarian left, and so on.  So one cannot look at extremism in isolation.  At the 
same time, sometimes there appears to be an  implicit coalition of opposites vs the centre, for example an 
implicit collaboration between the group at the extreme right and the group at the extreme left.  Both wish 
to undermine the centre.  One example is the Moro compromise.  Both elements on the extreme left and 
on the right in Italy hated the compromise.  Similarly in Israel- Palestine, the settlers and the suicide 
bombers of Hamas both have the objective of undermining the peace process, and the assassination of 
Rabin undermined the Oslo agreement.     9
(ii)  A model of the Calculus of Disconsent 
 
We assume that the goal of the organization is Z, which might be a state for the 
group which lacks a homeland, or a communist society, or a law banning abortions, or 
throwing all people of a certain race out of the country or an Islamic society governed by 
sharia law.   We do not inquire into the rationality of the belief in this goal but take it as 
given, as is normal in economic theory. The product of either moderate pressure or 
terrorism is an increase in Z.  Of particular importance, as emphasized previously, is that 
this goal is often indivisible, or displays increasing returns to scale.  This property is 
illustrated in Figure 2a, 2b and 2c, where the horizontal axis indicates the level of either 
land to the Palestinians, control over the means of production, the extent to which foreign 
forces are thrown out, etc., and the vertical axis the relationship between this intermediate 
goal and the final goal of the group (respectively, a Palestinian (or Jewish) state, a 
communist society, or an Islamic society).  This is the relationship that displays an 
indivisibility or increasing returns.  In each case there is a critical point, where enough of 
the intermediate goal has been obtained that the final goal is possible.   
Thus Figure 1 shows how communism displays this property, Figure 2 illustrates 
the case of Palestine - Israel, and Figure 3 contemporary Islamic extremism.  In each case 
there is an indivisibility or area of increasing returns between the intermediate goal and the 
ultimate goal of the group.  To fix ideas, it might be useful to think of an example where 
there is no indivisibility.  The objective of reducing income inequality, for example, is 
divisible.  Thus the level of income inequality in a society is a continuous variable which 
can take on any level from complete inequality to complete equality.  The most common 
way to represent this is via a Gini coefficient.  A graph of this (not shown) would display 
no indivisibility or increasing returns. Hence income inequality alone is not indivisible and 
does not provide a motive for extremist methods in the same way that nationalist or 
religious society aspirations do.  Consequently the latter provide a more important source 
of extremism than the former.  Marx, who relied on the income inequality of capitalist 
societies to provide the basic argument for revolution may have realized this and therefore 
substituted “class” for income.  The proletariat was supposed to get progressively poorer, 
and this progressive poverty would result in the attainment of class consciousness.  But, 
instead, the poor got richer, and, even more fundamental, it turned out to be entirely   10
feasible in many societies to move from one class to another. The basic reason for the 
failure of Marxist predictions to hold is that the poor got rich in most Western societies, 
and many of them moved from working class to middle class thus destroying the purported 
immobility between classes. For this reason, perhaps indivisible variables are always the 
source of revolution. 
          How does the existence of an indivisibility explain why a group would choose 
methods like terror to pursue its objectives?  According to the argument at the beginning of 
this section, the basic difference between terror and moderate pressure from the point of 
view of the group is that terror is risky.  We try to capture this feature in the choice among 
methods of pressure, e.g., that between moderate and extremist methods.  We represent that 
as follows: 
  Assume the organization has a production function which can either produce 
moderate (M) pressure or extremist incidents (I) in any combination from fixed levels of 
labour (L), capital (K) and organizational capacity O.   Of course there is a continuum of 
methods, beginning with voting, peaceful and lawful demonstrations, then civil 
disobedience, violence towards property, assassination of political enemies and ending with 
violence towards innocent civilians.  For the purpose of modeling we assume only two 
methods, one peaceful and lawful (and therefore riskless) and the other violent and risky.  
Then the level of moderate and extremist pressures is: 
 
(1) M = M (LM,KM,OM), I = I (LI,KI,OI) 
 
in which   
I =  the number of violent Incidents and  
M = the level of  Moderate pressure. 
 
  The organization’s total stock of L, K and O are fixed: 
(2) L = LM + LI ,  
        K=  KM + KI ,  
        O= OI + OM 
 
  The organization can produce any combination of moderate or extreme methods.    11
The more it chooses extreme or violent methods, the greater the level of risk undertaken. 
Let us first illustrate the general argument with a simple example.  Then we will develop it 
in more detail.   
  Figure 6 shows the goal of the group Z on the vertical axis.  Z  therefore represents 
either N, C or IS in Figures 2a, 2b, or 2c.  On the horizontal axis, we show the product of 
applying various methods of pressure.  Suppose that from the risky method there are three 
possible “states of the world” – success (and the achievement of a high level of pressure I1, 
in  which case the level of the goal achieved is Z0 +g, or failure (with level of pressure I0), 
in which case there are two possible outcomes.  In the first of these, the attempt to impose 
pressure fails and the outcome is simply the status quo Z0.  In the second, the attempt also 
fails and in addition, the leadership is caught, convicted and sanctioned, retarding the goals 
of the group. If the value of the sanction as measured by its cost to the goal of the group is -
f, then the outcome in that case is Z0 – f.  On the other hand the outcome of applying a 
moderate level of pressure is always the level of pressure M, with gains for the group equal 
to Z0 + m.   
 Thus   
g=  the gains to the group as estimated by its leader from using its organization and other 
factors of production to produce  successful terrorist incidents I 
m  = the (certain) gain to the group from using only moderate methods of pressure 
 
Then one dimension of the level of increasing returns may be summarized by the ratio 
g/m.  This is the ratio of the gains from successful terrorist pressure to moderate pressure. 
The higher this is, the more the function displays increasing returns.  
q = the probability that extremist methods succeed and the state accedes to the demands of 
the group 
1 – q = the probability that the methods fail  
p = the probability that, in addition to failure, the leadership of the extremist group is 
caught, convicted and sanctioned 
f = the cost of the sanction to the goals of the group 
Z0 = status quo income 
U = the utility function of the leadership 
   12
Then extremist methods will be chosen if: 
 
(3)   qU (Z0 + g) + (1-q) pU (Z0  - f)  + (1-q) (1-p) U (Z0 )    >   U (Z0  + m) 
 
  This equation shows how terror can be a rational choice.  A moderate level of 
pressure may leave the group stuck in the region of increasing returns, with the goal hardly 
advanced.  With terrorist or risky methods, on the other hand, it is possible that the group 
can achieve its goal.  Of course it is also possible that the group will fail, but note that the 
costs of failure are not that large because of increasing returns (Z0 – f is not that far from 
Z0).  Thus, given that the goal displays increasing returns, terrorism may be a rational 
choice.   
  The greater the indivisibility, the larger the ratio g/m the more likely extremist 
methods will be chosen, as shown in equation (3).  The main determinants are p,q, f and the 
size of the indivisibility g/m.  An increase in the likelihood that the methods succeed (q) 
will raise the likelihood that these methods are chosen.  Similarly, an increase in the 
capacity to manufacture terrorist incidents I would on the other hand raise the level of 
terror by raising the ratio g/m.   
  The figure also explains two other phenomena.  First, the enormous potential gains 
from terror explain the indifference of many extremist groups to loss of life, either that of 
their victims or the losses to members of the group who sacrifice themselves for the cause.  
Thus it shows that sanctions and other punitive measures against the group may not be 
effective.  Second, it shows the importance of paying attention to the goals of the group, as 
their indivisibility is central to the reason for the choice of terror as a mode of political 
competition.  And one way to combat terror is to try to make the indivisible goals divisible. 
  We shall return to these matters below.  First let us construct the argument more 
carefully.  For this purpose, Figure 3 shows the relationship between the instruments 
chosen (and therefore the level of risk) and the level of pressure exerted. At the origin on 
the horizontal axis, all of the factors of production are employed in moderate pressure, so 
the level of risk is zero.  As we move along the horizontal axis, more and more of the 
factors are employed in the risky method, terror.  The vertical axis shows the expected level 
of pressure which results.   Each point depicts the maximum level of pressure which it is 
possible to produce corresponding to that level of risk.  It seems reasonable to suppose that   13
taking at least some risk increases the expected level of pressure, so the curve depicted is 
initially upward sloping.  At some point, too much risk can be taken from the point of view 
of expending pressure and the slope of the curve turns negative.  The maximum level of 
expected pressure is the point Q, but the actual level decided upon by the leader of the 
organization will depend also on his or her attitude towards risk, as discussed further 
below. 
  The next question is the relationship between pressure and power. This depends on 
the structure of political institutions or the rules of the political game in the society where 
terrorist activity is undertaken.  To take the most obvious case first, suppose that the 
country is  a democracy, and that the assumptions underlying the median voter model are 
satisfied.  Then pressure succeeds only when the median voter is “persuaded” and fails 
otherwise. Once it succeeds, further pressure does not produce any more power. In that 
case, pressure produces zero power until the median voter is persuaded, it produces 
“absolute” power at that point, and beyond that point further pressure produces no further 
increase in power. Of course this depiction is extreme.  One way to relax the assumptions 
here is to allow for some uncertainty as to the location of the median voter.  Then the curve 
displaying the relationship between pressure and expected  power will again display 
increasing returns until the expected position of the median is reached, and diminishing 
returns thereafter. Again there will be a critical point, depicted as A in Figure 4, and this 
will be at the location of the median voter if the estimate of this position is unbiased. 
  Other possible models of democracy do not necessarily display such stark levels of 
increasing returns.  For example, if political parties maximize expected votes, as in the 
probabilistic voting model (see Mueller (2003) for a survey).  Similarly, pressure group 
models do not display this property (see Austin Smith in Mueller (1997) for a survey).    
  Another possibility is that the regime is a dictatorship. Here, once again we would 
expect that the curve would display increasing returns, since the point of “extremist” 
protest vs  a dictatorship is to cause the regime’s downfall, and the point at which the state 
is weakened sufficiently for a revolution to take place is obviously a critical point.  Short of 
having sufficient support to effect this revolution, most attempts at protest will simply bring 
problems for those who attack the regime.  Indeed, in recent years, the literature on 
revolution is replete with such things as the possibility of bandwagon effects or the 
achievement of “critical mass” (see Rasler (1996), or  Opp and Ruehl (1990) as depicted in   14
Figure 4.  
  If Figure 4 does have the shape depicted, this only reinforces the degree of 
increasing returns to extremism and the basic argument made here.  However, it is not 
necessary to our argument.  Only if Figure 4 displayed diminishing returns throughout 
would the picture we are developing be possibly undermined. 
  Figure 5 then displays the relationship between power and the immediate objective, 
eg, land for the Palestinians, control over the means of production, or ridding the country of 
non Islamic authorities, domestic or foreign.  For simplicity these are all represented by the 
variable L .  There seems no compelling reason to believe that this relationship is non-
linear, hence it is depicted as a straight line.   
One way to illustrate our basic point can be seen in Figure 7.  Our assumption (1)  
implies that the group leader can choose any combination of extremist methods and 
moderate methods.  So the level of risk which can be undertaken is completely variable.   
The horizontal axis displays this level of risk and the vertical axis the expected total returns 
to it, that is, the value to the group of the achievement of its final goals at different levels of 
risk
4. The curve in Figure 7 displays the risk – total return relationship for a group which is 
contemplating various methods of pressure from fixed resources.  Equilibrium is at the 
point E0, σ
2
0, if the group decision maker is risk averse.  The indivisibility implies that, from 
the point of view of the group’s decision makers, very little is to be expected from 
moderate methods of pressure, and even switching some resources into extremist methods 
does not advance the goals of the organization very much.  As pressure is ratcheted up, the 
gains from it increase at an increasing rate over a substantial range.  Ultimately the rate of 
increase of these gains tapers off, and they continue to increase but at a decreasing rate.  So 
only at large levels of pressure do the gains become sufficiently large that the objective can 
be said to be reached.  Finally a point is reached when so much risk is taken that it actually 
becomes counterproductive, ie after that point returns are negatively correlated with risk.   
But the essential point is that the larger the range of increasing returns or the greater the 
indivisibility, the more likely the group is to choose extremist or terrorist methods 
compared to moderate measures of pressure.   
To see this point, look at Figure 8.  Suppose that the leadership of the group 
                                                 
4 Note that the vertical axis depicts the total proceeds or return from a given “portfolio”of moderate and 
terrorist actions, not the average expected return on the portfolio.   15
becomes more extreme.  This can occur in two ways.  The first is displayed in Figure 8a.  
There, the leadership becomes more extreme in the sense that they believe that it requires 
more of the group’s intermediate objective before the group can achieve its goal.  Thus, to 
illustrate with the Israel - Palestine question, the group may be said to become more 
extreme when it believes that only when it is in possession of more of the total land in 
Israel-Palestine can a Palestinian (or Jewish) state be achieved.  Thus the curve and its 
inflexion point moves to the right in Figure 8a.    Assuming for simplicity that the data 
underlying figures 3- 5 is unchanged, the result in risk- return space is as depicted in Figure 
8b.  The new equilibrium is at E1 in Figure 8b. Note that the return to risk has fallen (for 
any level of risk, the return E(N) is lower).  Nevertheless, the leadership will decide to take 
more risk, as shown by the point E1 compared to the original equilibrium at E0.  A 
sufficient (though possibly not necessary) condition for this result is that the utility function 
is homothetic.  In that case, our basic result follows:  the more extreme the goals of the 
group, the more it will tend to use extremist methods.   
Of course mistakes are possible.  Extremist methods might have been chosen by 
mistake.  For example the curve may be mis- estimated so that civil disobedience i.e., 
moderate methods of pressure would actually have been sufficient.  In this case, the 
production function actually has its critical point at a fairly low level of Z.  But equilibrium 
(because of the mis Bestimation) is at a high level of risk or extremism.   
    The capacity for mistakes implies that terrorists sometimes end up on the 
downward sloping portion of the curve in Figure 7. They go too far.  Perhaps the most 
outstanding recent example is the killing of Aldo Moro in Italy, which seemed to everyone 
a mistake and after which support for the terrorists dried up and the era of terror ended.  
However, recall that their basic objective was achieved in that the communist party never 
joined the government.  
The central question from the policy point of view is the following: Is it not 
possible that if one could raise p and f sufficiently, terror could be eliminated?  Why cannot 
the state raise p and f sufficiently high so that “terrorism doesn’t pay” in the same way that 
Becker suggested can be done for ordinary crimes?  Perhaps the most important reason is 
due to the indivisibility.  This implies that the gains to the group if successful are so large 
that it may be impossible to deter them by the kinds of penalties that would be considered 
by civilized societies. Moreover, if the group is very far from its goal, as in Figure  6, the   16
losses to the group from the penalty do not leave it all that much further away, again a 
consequence of the indivisibility.  So we return to our basic point.  Basically, what limits 
the possibility of eliminating terrorism by punishment is the indivisibility. 
  Other reasons can be elaborated if we recall that further work on crime, especially 
by Akerlof and Yellen (1994) and by Andreoni (1995) suggested that there were other 
limits to punishment besides the cost of the resources used in pursuing criminals and 
punishing them discussed by Becker (1968).  The first is that too high punishments could 
lose the support of the community, thus reducing p, and the second, that juries might be 
less willing to convict in the case of capital punishment, since they would be afraid of 
making an error.  So on both counts, the limit to f is that p = p(f), p’  <  0.  Now in the case 
of terrorism this limit is even more pronounced, essentially because the implementation of 
punishments which are “excessively” high is often exactly what the terrorists are hoping 
for.  This further limit on the capacity to control terrorism by policing can be adduced by 
looking at these social interactions in more detail.   
  Consider bandwagon effects first.  The possibility that a critical mass or bandwagon 
effect takes place again differentiates the world of terror from the world of crime, namely 
that the key in terrorism is to increase support for the cause while no such goalCand no 
such dependence on an external audience of potential supporters - exists in the world of 
crime.  So this provides another reason why ordinary, non risk- preferring leaders of 
pressure groups would choose terror over moderation. 
  To do so, let 
 
r = the probability of an outcry or bandwagon effect which gains + h to the group as the 
result of the overreaction of the state.  Then  the choice between methods becomes  
 
(4) qU (Z0 + g) + (1-q) prU (Z0  - f + h) +  (1-q)p(1-r) U (Z0  - f) + (1-q)(1-p)  U ( Z0) 
  
 >   U (Z0 + m) 
 
Clearly, the payoff to terrorist methods is larger, the larger the level of r. 
  The other important social interaction that could be introduced is the probability of 
a violent response, not from the state, but from the group at the other extreme.  This might    17
result in losses to the group -l.  Alternatively it might produce  gains +l if the reaction of 
the other group helps it in its cause.  This is particularly likely to be the case if the objective 
of both extremist groups is the destruction of the centre. 
  To model this, introduce s = the probability of a violent response from the group at 
the other extreme;  and that this results in losses to the group -l.  (or gains +l) 
 
(5)  s [qU (Z0 + g) + (1-q) prU (Z0   - f + h) + (1-q)p (1-r) U (Z0  - f) + (1-q)(1-p)U (Z0 
 +l) ]     + (1-s)   [qU (Z0 + g) + (1-q) prU (Z0  - f + h) + (1-q)p (1-r) U (Z0   - f) + (1-q)(1-
p)  U (Z0) ]      >   U (Z0 + m) 
 
  Again, the effect is to make extremism more attractive if l is positive, and the 
reverse if l is negative. 
  The difficulties discussed above with eliminating terror through policing and 
sanctions leads to the consideration of other methods.  There are three main classes of 
these:  the first is that the state can reduce the gains to the group by providing alternative 
sources of social cohesion.  The second one is to emphasize human rights, and thus to 
possibly reduce the control of the group over the individual.  And the third one of these is 
to make the indivisibility divisible.  These three methods are discussed shortly.  But first let 
us turn to the comparative statics of the model. 
 
(iii)  Comparative statics 
  
  The model  leads to the following predictions.  The level of extremist methods 
chosen will be higher (>), or lower (<) when: 
 
1. The costs to the state of accommodation are larger (implying a fall in q) (>) 
2.  The state’s capacity for repression increases (again, decreasing q) (<) 
3.  Perhaps most interestingly, suppose that the utility of the status quo to the group is less 
(U (Z0)) falls).  Here it seems that the model makes no prediction, contrary to the popular 
belief that this should positively affect extremism.  So long as both moderate and extreme 
methods are available, a change in Z0  affects both sides of equation (3)- (5) symmetrically. 
 Only if extremist methods were the only ones available would a fall in Z affect the calculus   18
of disconsent. 
4.  The  probability that state repression will lead to an outcry, which in turn, results in 
more repression is larger   > 
5.  The probability that the violence of the group provokes a violent response from those at 
the other extreme is larger.  This gives rise to two contradictory ripple effects: 
1/ A multiplier effect which weakens the state (>) 
2/The possibility that the other side will win increases, making the group 
worse off than under the status quo.  (<) 
6.  The probability that non extremist methods or moderate methods will produce the goal 
which is desired.(<) Thus the existence of barriers to entry into normal politics, promotes 
extremism (>). 
7.  The possibility of forming coalitions with those in the immediate centre increases, ie, 
how quickly do losses increase as the group changes its position and moves towards the 
immediate center? (<) 
8. The size of the group.  The larger it is, the greater the likelihood of accommodation 
under democracy. (<) 
9.  Social variables that are neglected in this strictly rational calculus.  For example, if it is 
not possible to communicate with others outside the group (alienation) this might increase 
the likelihood of the use of extremist methods (>), or if norms exist that would be violated 
through the use of extremist methods, this would decrease it (<). 
10.  The position of the group --the more extreme it is, the less likely democratic 
accommodation will work. (<) 
 
6.     Making the indivisible divisible 
 
  In the last section I suggested some limitations on sanctions as a solution to the 
problem of terrorism.  Other policies which might be used to combat it include policies that 
break the hold of the group over the individual.  For example, state provision of public 
goods and of transfer payments such as welfare, unemployment insurance, family 
allowances etc. may enhance the workings of families, firms and social organizations 
within the society and in this and other ways reduce the dependence of the individual on 
extremist groups.  Another possibility is that the state can produce public goods and the   19
more successfully it does so, the more favorably individuals may view the state, and the 
less they will be willing to join and take actions in organizations that are fundamentally 
hostile to the state and engaged in trying to weaken it.  
  An emphasis on human rights might also reduces the power of the group over the 
individual. I treat this matter in considerably more detail in another paper, on the supply of 
suicide martyrs (Wintrobe 2001, 2003), but it is worth mentioning here.   
  The present paper focuses on the demand for (rather than the supply of) suicide 
martyrs and for other forms of terrorist activity.  The basic policy implication from this 
point of view would appear to be that to understand and to combat extremism it is 
necessary to take the objective of the group seriously, and to try to find ways to provide it 
to some extent and thus to satisfy the demands of moderates (people who condone 
moderate pressure) without going all the way to satisfying the extremists’ demands.  The 
way to do this is to “unbundle the theoretically indivisible objective and to show that it may 
be met without the radical overhaul of society demanded, and without having to destroy 
one side or the other.  Here are a few examples.     
The advent of Keynesian economics in the 1930’s showed that the state could solve 
the problem of unemployment without giving up on capitalism.  In this sense Keynes 
“saved” capitalism, as is often remarked.  There is a certain sense in which communism is 
divisible, and its indivisibility a feature of its ideology and not of the goals to which that 
ideology is supposed to point such as greater freedom, security, more equality, etc.   Thus 
while no society has ever given to each according to his needs and take from each 
according to his ability some societies do this more than others.  And the instruments of the 
welfare state such as welfare programs, unemployment insurance , transfers to the poor, 
training programs, universal medicare and others all have the effect of providing some of 
the objectives of communism without comprehensive state control over the means of 
production.   
In the same way problems of ethnic conflict have been solved in Canada and in 
many other states through institutions which give different groups a share in power.  Thus 
features like federalism, the division of powers, checks and balances, features of 
proportional representation, etc. all give groups some power without satisfying what they 
thought was an indivisible objective.  In the same way, explicit power sharing has long 
been a familiar feature of so called divided societies.   Even in conquered Iraq, the basic   20
idea implemented with respect to the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq is to give each 
group a share in power. 
  Indeed in many societies where there are conflictual problems, the solution 
sometimes advocated to them is to provide a division of powers among different levels of 
government.  Indeed some advocate a form of group rights (Kymlicka (1995)), though this 
idea remains extremely controversial. Canada is among the countries which has proceeded 
farthest along the lines of decentralization. Canada has gone very far in the direction of 
federalism and there is an elaborate division of powers between the different levels of 
government.  Sometimes as in the case of Quebec, a linguistic (federal) minority controls a 
powerful provincial government.  It is possible to use Jewish law in Canada to solve 
disputes (when both parties agree) and there is currently a movement to allow the use of 
sharia law for the same purpose.  Thus the specific demands of religious and ethnic groups 
may often be accommodated within an otherwise secular democratic society.  
 
7.         Conclusion 
 
The basic point of this paper is straightforward.  Under certain circumstances, 
groups which take extremist positions on issues tend also to use extremist methods such as 
terrorism, violence and assassination, to pursue those goals.  To understand why, we started 
with the idea that the basic difference between extremist methods of political competition 
and accepted methods is that extremist methods are usually risky.  In that sense the paper 
takes the same starting point in understanding extremism as Becker took in understanding 
crime.  Indeed, extremist methods such as terrorism are simply politically motivated crime. 
 Like ordinary crime, extremist methods can either succeed or fail and if they fail they often 
imply a retarding of the goals of the group and possible criminal prosecution and 
punishment.  Indeed terrorism often represents the ultimate in crime, since, particularly in 
its modern form it often results in the deaths of innocent civilians and in any of its forms it 
represents a direct challenge to the state.  Thus the state often reacts to it with the most 
severe punishments available.  
Extremists in position adopt extremist methods when there is an indivisibility which 
characterizes the relationship between the intermediate goal of the group and its ultimate 
goal.  In the paper I look at three examples which represent the three most common kinds   21
of extremism in the twentieth and twenty- first centuries:  Communism (control over the 
means of production is an intermediate goal to the achievement of a communist society), 
Nationalism (control over territory is an intermediate goal to the achievement of 
nationhood) and Islamic Fundamentalism (ridding the Muslim nations of foreign and 
secular influences is an intermediate goal to the achievement of an Islamic society based on 
`sharia law).   Metaphorically, in each case, the leaders of these groups are in the position 
of someone starting out at the beginning of a long desert at the end of which there is a 
mountain, and only when the top of the mountain has been reached can the group be said to 
achieve its goal.  The longer the desert, and the taller the mountain, the greater the 
temptation to use extremist methods.  Moreover, the larger the indivisibility, the more the 
group will tend to be indifferent to sacrifices of human life by both victims and members, 
since the potential gains to the group from reaching its goals will be large compared to any 
conceivable losses.  In turn, conflict between each of these and opposing groups 
(respectively, capitalism, other nations with the same territorial ambition, secularism), in a 
sense, inevitable as it results from the conflict between their ultimate goals. 
On the other hand, extremists with divisible objectives—more income inequality, a 
cleaner environment, fewer abortions, fewer controls on guns—do not typically use 
extremist methods. And those who do, I submit, are those who tend to perceive an 
indivisibility, as in the case of anti- abortionists who see the fetus as a complete human 
being at an early stage of development, or those environmentalists who perceive a 
“catastrophe” and not a continuity in the level of destruction of the environment.   Thus, 
once again, the use of extremist methods follows from a perceived indivisibility in the 
extremist’s position and is not a separate feature of preferences.  
If correct, the paper would appear to raise a troubling challenge to liberal theory.  
Freedom of thought is central to liberal theory provided that democratic methods are used 
to pursue that goal. If there tends to be a correlation between extremist positions and 
extremist (non democratic) methods, then it may be difficult for the state to combat the 
latter without imposing controls on the former.  Such laws are in fact in force in some 
countries as exemplified by laws against “hate” speech.  But how far can one go along 
these lines and still remain democratic? 
The most important policy implication of the paper is that one should look at the 
goal of the extremist group in order to understand its actions.  The reason is that it is the   22
purported indivisibility of the goal which explains the extremism of the actions, and if one 
can un- bundle the goal or make the indivisible divisible, then there may be ways to 
provide these goals in a way which satisfies some of the members of the group and thus 
dries up support for the grander ambitions of the leaders of extremist groups.  In turn this 
policy implication shows the difficulties with the implication of the previous paragraph:  
the more one sanctions and prevents freedom of speech, the less likely is it that moderate 
forces will understand the goals of the extremists, and the more difficult it will be to satisfy 
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Figure 1.   Two kinds of extremism 
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N = nationhood 
E  = even with no land, the Palestinians are “conscious” of nationhood. 
C  =  critical point (where increasing returns region ends), as (some) Palestinans feel 
that this is the minimum they need to form a nation.  (Some) Israelis feel that if they 
give them that much THEY won’t have enough land to constitute a state because their 
borders will be insecure.  So C is the critical point for these two groups. 
G = area where more land is still insufficient to provide enough space to enable the 
group to fully become a nation
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Increasing returns in Palestine – Israel   25
 
C = Communism 
At D, the state has sufficient control over the means of production so that C is possible, 
so D = critical point 
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Communism and control over the means of production   26
 
 
At D, enough foreign or secùlar domination has been removed to make an Islamic 
society possible.
Absence of foreign / secular 
domination 
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       Islamic society and foreign /secular domination   27
 





Figure 3.  The choice among methods of pressure is  
essentially a decision about risk 
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Figure 4.  How pressure translates into power.   The possibilities are:  Median voter,  
Interest  group equilibrium, or Pressure vs Dictatorship (e.g., tinpot or totalitarian).  
Under most possibilities there is again a critical point (A).  But this is not the case with 
a pressure group equilibrium, or with models where parties maximize votes, as in 
probabilistic voting models. 
P 
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ΠM = the level of power  produced by “moderate” methods such as civil disobedience 
Π  =   Π0  or Π1  = the level of power produced by extremist methods.   
The figure assumes a linear relation between power and the immediate objective, either land, 
control over the means of production, or ridding the country of non – Islamic authorities.
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Summary diagram 1.  This shows the relationship believed to exist between pressure or 
terror and the level of the ultimate objective (Z) that is achieved.
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Summary diagram 2.  Another way to see the relationship between pressure (or risk) 
and the level of the ultimate objective achieved.  The figure shows an equilibrium (E0) 
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  Figure 8b.  A more extremist position implies greater 
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